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Usually, one speaks of mathematisation of a natural or social science to mean that 
mathematics comes to be a tool of such a science: the language of mathematics is used to 
formulate its results, and/or some mathematical techniques are employed to obtain these 
results.  
It seems to me that the notion of mathematisation is misleading when used in this sense, 
however. Instead, we should distinguish what I would like to call “mathematisation” from 
something quite different I would call “application of mathematics”.  
We should speak of application of mathematics to a natural or social science when a 
natural phenomenon that such a science is studying is described or explained using 
mathematics, or when a problem this science aims to solve is answered by means of 
mathematical techniques. By contrast, we should speak of mathematisation only when the 
object of this science becomes a mathematical object, i.e. mathematics provides a model or 
a scheme of a natural or social phenomenon and this model or scheme becomes the real 
object of studying. I shall illustrate this distinction by means of the example of the science 
of motion from Aristotle to the middle of 18th century. The same example will also be used 
to illustrate another topic, namely when analytical mechanics was born. 
                                                
* The present paper has been completed during a visiting scholarship at the Faculty of Sciences (dpt. of 
Mathematics) of the University of Mexico-City (UNAM). I thank it for its logistic and financial support. I 
thank also Pierre Souffrin for useful discussions concerning a part of my paper. 
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Concerning my first topic, the standard view maintains that the mathematisation of the 
science of motion begins within 17th century, specially thank to Galileo. Moreover, it 
maintains that the mathematisation of the science of motion is a distinctive character of the 
“scientific revolution”. But, I do not think that something as a “scientific revolution” 
occurred in 17th century (or in some other date in the history of science). I shall not discuss 
this point here however. I will confine myself to argue, according to my previous 
distinction, that when application of mathematics to the science of motion is a usual practice 
within Aristotelian physics, no mathematisation of this science occurs before Newton. From 
such point of view, Galileo's theories of motion share with Scholastic theories an essential 
aspect: they do not deal with a mathematical object, but they merely use a mathematical 
theory (that is actually a suitable version of classical theory of proportion) to deal with some 
natural phenomenon.  
Concerning my second topic, there is no standard view. That analytical mechanics was 
born in 18th century is a well-grounded historiographical judgement. When it is used in 
historiographical contexts, the term “analytical mechanics” is quite imprecise, however. 
This made the previous judgement open to different interpretations, each of them ascribing 
to this term a different meaning. I shall consider two examples of such different conceptions 
that seem to me to be opposite end extreme. 
1. Two opposite conceptions about the birth of analytical mechanics 
In his many and fundamental essays on the history of mechanics, Clifford Truesdell seems 
to use the term “analytical mechanics” in a very strict sense. According to him this term has 
to be used, in historiografical contexts as well in scientific ones, to designate a part of 
mechanics and specifically of rational mechanics. The following quotation is typical of this 
attitude: 
Mechanics appears [in Lagrange’s Méchanique analitique1] as a physically closed subject, a branch 
of the theory of differential equations. 
[…] As its title implies, the Méchanique Analitique is not a treatise on rational mechanics, but rather 
a monograph on one method of deriving differential equations of motions, mainly in the special branch 
now called, after it, analytical mechanics.2  
                                                
1 Cf. Lagrange (1788). 
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A similar judgement is also advanced by Truesdell in the preface of his First Course in 
Rational Continuum Mechanics: 
[...] that book [Lagrange’s Méchanique analitique] covers only certain aspects o the rational 
mechanics created by Lagrange’s great predecessors [...]. 
In 1788 [the date of publication of Lagrange’s Méchanique analitique] the mechanics of deformable 
bodies, which is inherently not only subtler, more beautiful, and grander but also far closer to nature 
than is the rather arid special case called “analytical mechanics”, had been explored only in terms of 
isolated examples, brilliant but untypical.3 
Thus, according to Truesdell’s conception, the term “analytical mechanics” has to be used 
in historiographical context, in a sense that is very close to the sense it takes in the present-
day treatises of classical mechanics, where it refers to that part of mechanics that treats of 
the equations of motion for dynamic systems, and particularly of the equations connected to 
the Lagrange’s ones. 
Of course, in Truesdell’s interpretation the adjective “analytical” qualifies the term 
“mechanics” by limiting its scope. This limitation entails a number of different aspects. The 
first aspect is quite obvious, being connected with the fact that, by speaking of analytical 
mechanics, we are implicitly speaking of classical (rather than relativistic or quantum) 
mechanics. By contrast, the second aspect is only apparently obvious. Though it is 
connected with the plain fact that, by speaking of analytical mechanics, we are implicitly 
speaking of mathematical mechanics, it is not so obvious because of the way in which 
Truesdell means this fact. He seems to think first that mechanics’ being mathematical is the 
same that its being rational. Then he assumes that, since it is mathematical, rational 
mechanics is, as such, a part of mathematics4. Finally he maintains that rational mechanics 
“is that part of mathematics that provides and develops logical models for the enforced 
changes of positions and shape which we see everyday things suffer”5. In the first of these 
attitudes, Truesdell follows Newton who in the preface to the Principia (that is for Truesdell 
                                                                                                                                                
2 Cf. Truesdell (1968), p. 134 (“A Program toward Rediscovering the Rational Mechanics of the Age of 
Reason“, first publication in 1960, Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 1, 1960-1962, 3-36). 
3 Cf. Truesdell (1977), vol. I, p. XI. 
4 Cf. for example Truesdell (1968), p. 335 (“Recent Advances in Rational Mechanics”, first published, in a 
different version in Science, 127, 1958, pp. 729-739). 
5 Cf. Truesdell (1977), vol. I, p. 4. As Truesdell explicitly remarks the term “things” refers here to natural 
things (as animals, plants, seas, minerals, planets, etc.) and man’s artifices. 
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the first treatise of rational mechanics6) maintained that mechanics is either rational or 
practical and, when it is rational, it “accurate procedit” and thus “ad geometriam referatur”7. 
The third aspect is only apparently obvious too. For it is concerned with the fact that 
mathematics which enters analytical mechanics is a particular one: it is just analytical 
mathematics. The difficulty is here concerned with the different sense of this last term: 
“analytic mathematics”. I confine myself here to observe that for Truesdell this means that 
mathematics is here merely a tool to provide a formalistic exposition of mechanics, where 
this was not the case, for example, for Jean Bernoulli or Euler which used mathematics to 
make clear the fundamental concept of rational mechanics8. Finally, the fourth aspect is in 
no sense obvious at all. It comes from Truesdell’s attitude to transpose on historical 
contexts the present-day practice to consider analytical mechanics as concerned only with a 
certain sort of mechanical problems and a certain type of formalism. In the already quoted 
preface of the Principia, Newton says that “Mechanica rationalis erit Scentia Motuum qui 
ex viribus quibscunque resultant, et virium quæ ad motus quoscunque requiruntur, accurate 
proposita ac demonstrata”9. Truesdell seems to assume that rational mechanics as such 
understands this definition in a large sense, while analytical mechanics understand it in such 
a limiting sense to constraint itself to the consideration of the motion (and equilibrium) of 
discrete systems of bodies (also considered under certain restrictive conditions). 
Starting from a similar conception, Truesdell has to assume that analytical mechanics is 
essentially the result of Lagrange’s formalistic conception of mathematics, even though 
other works, as Euler’s Mechanica10 for example11, are part of its early history. 
The second example refers to a more widespread attitude among historians of mechanics 
and mathematics. This attitude has been very well exposed by Michel Blay in his book 
                                                
6 Cf. Truesdell (1968), p. 335 (“Recent Advances [...]”, op. cit.). 
7 Cf. Newton (1687), Præfatio ad lectorem, first page [not numerated]. 
8 Cf. Truesdell (1968), pp. 133-134 (“A Program [...]”, op. cit.). 
9 Cf. Newton (1687), Prœfatio ad lectorem, first page [not numerated]. 
10 Cf. Euler (1736). 
11 Cf. Truesdell (1968), p. 106 (“A Program [...]”, op. cit.). 
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concerned with the Naissance de la mécanique analytique12. Blay assumes that the term 
“analytical mechanics” in the title of his book refers to an analytical (rather that a 
geometrical) way to do mechanics. I quote the Avant-propos of Blay’s book: 
[…] ce livre […] est construit autour de deux questions précises: 
— Comment la conceptualisation differentielle de la science du mouvement a-t-elle été obtenue? 
— Comment cette concetualisation différentielle a-t-elle pu favoriser la réorganisation et le 
développement de la science de mouvement? 
Partant de ces deux questions, nous voudrions déterminer aussi exactement que possible par quelles 
démarches et au moyen de quels concepts une science analytique du mouvement a réussi à se 
constituer.13 
Thus, for Blay, as well as for Truesdell, the adjective “analytical” qualifies the term 
“mechanics” by limiting its scope, but the only aspect of such a limitation, on which Blay 
seems to agree completely with Truesdell, is the first of the previous ones: by speaking of 
analytical mechanics, we speak of classical mechanics. Of course, there is also a sense in 
which Blay agrees with Truesdell on the second and third aspect, but it seems to me that this 
is just the sense that makes these aspects obvious: analytical mechanics is a mathematical 
theory and it is concerned with a particular sort of mathematics. Starting from his premises, 
Blay obviously maintains that analytical mechanics origins when Newtonian mechanics is 
translated from its original geometrical style in an analytical (that is a differential) language. 
According to Blay, this is initially done by Pierre Varignon who devoted to such an aim a 
number of papers between 1698 and 171114. To discuss these papers is the principal matter 
of Blay’s book.  
In his short article on classical mechanics in Grattan-Guinness’ Companion 
Encyclopaedia, Craig Fraser accepts a perspective very similar to Blay’s15. Here is what he 
writes under the title “Analytical Mechanics”: 
The eighteen-century progress of theoretical mechanics occurred almost entirely on the Continent, 
using the mathematics of the Leibnitian calculus. The Principia became historically influential once its 
theory had been absorbed by researches working in the scientific academies of Paris, Berlin and St 
Petesburg. The French priest Pierre Varignon wrote a series of memoirs beginning in 1700 on orbital 
dynamics that employed Leibnitian analytical methods. He gave an elegant demonstration of Principia, 
                                                
12 Cf Blay (1992). 
13 Cf. ibid., p. 8. 
14 Cf. Blay (1992), pp. 153-221 and 277-321, where a complete bibliography of Varignon's papers on this 
subjects is given, and Bertoloni-Meli (1993), pp. 201-205. 
15 Cf. Fraser (1994), particularly pp. 973-975. 
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Book I, Proposition 11 that replaced Newton’s involved geometric reasoning by a simple algorithmic 
procedure. Varignon contemporaries John I Bernoulli and Jakob Hermann also contributed to his 
subject, providing a uniform mathematical treatment of the so-called ‘inverse problem’ in which it was 
required to determine the orbit from a knowledge of the force law.16 
Fraser insists, however, on the essential role, in the development of the analytical 
mechanics, of Euler’s differential formulation of the second Law of Newton, occurred only 
in 175017. 
I do not want to deny the legitimacy of the two previous interpretations of the term 
“analytical mechanics” in historical contexts. On the one hand, their difference can be 
finally reduced to a merely terminological one and it is also possible that the distinctions 
introduced by Truesdell are accepted by someone that decides to use the term “analytical 
mechanics” in historical contexts as Blay and Fraser do. On the other hand, it is clear that 
neither Truesdell, nor anyone else can deny the existence of a relevant difference between 
the geometrical style of Newton’s Principia and the analytical style of the most part of 
treatises and memoirs devoted to mechanical subjects in the 18th century. Since Blay and 
Fraser use the term “analytical mechanics” just to refer to such an important difference, that 
I am obviously far to deny, it is clear that I can not disagree on any important point with 
them. Besides, even though I can follow Truesdell neither in his idiosyncratic insistence in 
diminishing the role and importance of Lagrange’s contributions to mechanics and in 
reducing them to a mere formalistic compilation, nor in his implicit elimination of 
Aristotelian tradition from the history of mechanics, I think his distinctions are correct and I 
agree with him in stressing that 18th century mechanics was not only (and perhaps not 
mainly) a theory of motion and equilibrium for discrete systems of bodies. 
Thus, the only incompatibility between the thesis I will defend here and the previous ones 
is terminological. But, since the term which is concerned—that is just the adjective 
“analytical”—is a crucial term in a very large number of scientific texts in the 18th century, 
                                                
16 Cf. ibid., p. 974. 
17 Cf. Euler (1750). Note that in this paper, Euler presents the Nawton’s law (in his new formulation) as a 
“new principle of mechanics” that he pretends to have discovered. Lots of papers have been written on the 
subject of Newton's second Law where distinct interpretation of it and of its role and meaning in the Principia 
are discussed. Among the more recent ones, cf. Verlet (1996) where a large bibliography is given. 
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this terminological incompatibility has a more fundamental meaning and is strictly 
connected with my first distinction between the application of mathematics to a certain 
science and the mathematisation of this science. I think that when the adjective “analytical” 
is used in 18th century to refer to mechanics, it takes a meaning which is both narrower than 
that Blay and Fraser ascribe to it and larger than that Truesdell ascribes to it. My only aim is 
to suggest a possible reconstruction of this meaning. 
As I have already anticipated, I shall consider here only one example, that is that of the 
science of motion, and even more particularly, the theories of motion of one or more 
(indeformable and distinct) bodies. Of course, mechanics is more than that. Nevertheless, I 
maintain that this example is historically relevant as such. 
Before presenting my point (and justifying my historical judgements) let me sketch what I 
mean as the main lines of the development of the theory of motion from Aristotle to 
Newton. This shall allow me to illustrate partially my first distinction. 
2. Classical frameworks in the science of motion from Aristotle to Newton 
Even though Aristotle provides, in the third book of Physics, a logical definition of it as 
“the fulfilment of what is potentially, as such”18, he19 seems to consider motion (κι′νησις) 
as a primitive phenomenon. The definition need not introduce or fix the notion of motion, 
but provides only a logical analysis of it, in terms of the fundamental notions of the science 
of being, or metaphysics. We could even claim that with such a definition Aristotle 
legitimates the notion of potentiality, “en lui faisant représenter conceptuellement une 
réalité physique évidente”20. Aristotelian science of motion is thus the science of such a 
reality and not a science of an abstract object defined in terms of the primitive notions of 
fulfilment and potentiality. Moreover, Aristotle appeals to motion, as a real phenomenon, in 
order to characterise both nature and the science of nature, since, according to him, nature is 
“a principle or cause of being moved”21, and the science of nature is essentially the science 
of motion. The reality of motion is a composite reality, however, since there are different 
                                                
18 Cf. Aristotle, Physic, 201a 10-11. 
19 I have discussed Aristotelian conception of motion in Panza (1992b). 
20 Cf. Carteron (1923), p. 211. 
21 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, 192b 21. 
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sorts of motion, according to the different modalities of fulfilment or potentiality. Such a 
difference is also a primitive reality and it is as such perfectly evident to us. Namely, we are 
able to distinguish displacement (ϕορα′)—that is the fulfilment of the potentiality of taking 
certain different positions or occupying certain places—from other kinds of motion. 
By contrast, according to Aristotle, time is not a primitive or external reality, but only a 
phenomenological form of our perception of motion, or an abstract representation of it. 
Logically, it is the “number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’”22, where the term 
“number” refers to what is numbered, rather than to what we use to number. However, the 
time, understood as the number of a certain motion, can be used to measure other motions. 
Namely, the number of the first (eternal, necessary and continuous) motion—that is the 
circular displacement of the first heaven—can be used to measure particular motions.  
These are nothing but local and accidental consequences (or even local expressions, or 
accidental particularisations) of the first motion due to particular causes. As such, they are 
not only characterised by their respective measures, according to the time of the first 
motion, but also by the particularity both of the potentiality of which they are the fulfilment 
and of their subject. These positions change from a point to another point by following a 
continuous path, while time23 (continuously) evolves from an instant to another instant24. 
Thus, by abstracting from the particular bodies which are moving and from the causes of 
their motions, different particular displacements can be compared—as quantities are 
compared (that is according to an order relation, including the possibility of equality 
between distinct objects)—by comparing their paths and the respective times. As this is a 
double comparison and paths are not always comparable as such, Aristotle can not get in 
                                                
22 Cf. ibid., 219b 2. 
23 In what follows, I shall use the term “time” to refer both to the time of the first motion, that is the time as 
such, and to a fragment of the time of the first motion, that is a temporal interval. The context will make clear 
what of these meanings is intended. 
24 Even though such a description of a particular displacement in term of a moving body, a path and a 
certain time seems to be accepted by Aristotle as perfectly legitimate, it is far to be unproblematic in 
Aristotelian framework. As a matter of fact, the exigency to make it clearer is one of the main motivations for 
scholastic discussions about motion. I dealt with an example of these discussions in my (1994), where a large 
bibliography of secondary literature is also provided  
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such a way a total order of displacements and he is only able to compare certain particular 
displacements to certain other ones.  
In fact, though Aristotle speaks about speed, when two particular displacements are 
compared in such a way, we have not to imagine that he compares the displacements by 
comparing their respective speeds. Even though any particular displacement has for 
Aristotle a certain speed, he never says exactly what speed is, and how it is measured in 
terms of the path of this displacement and of the time taken to cover it. Aristotle could not 
have been able to define speed as the ratio of space and time. This does not only depend on 
its general conception of nature and of its first principles, it is also connected to the absence 
in Greek mathematics of something similar to our conception of ratio between two 
quantities, particularly if two non-homogeneous quantities—as a path and a time—are 
considered. As long as it can not be a ratio (or any sort of entity defined in terms of space 
and time), speed is, according to Aristotle, a specific and primitive property of particular 
displacements, that is a quality of real phenomena. Of course, this property changes when 
the covered path and the corresponding time change and vice versa, but it is not determined 
as such when this path and this time are determined: it is not reducible to them.  
In short, for Aristotle motion is a natural primitive phenomenon that can be characterised 
in general in term of the fundamental metaphysical categories of fulfilment and potentiality 
and described in its particular manifestation by specifying the particular body which is 
moving, the causes of its motion, the path this body covers, the time it takes to do it, and the 
speed with which it does it. From such a point of view no mathematisation of the science of 
motion is of course possible. No obstacle forbids to apply mathematics to the study of 
motion, however. Though Aristotle did not write, as long we know, any mathematical 
treatise on motion, he referred, in a number of occasions, to some mathematical notion in 
order to speak about motion. In particular, he did it when he considered the relations 
different displacements have with each other.  
If two displacements take the same time (or equal times) and the paths are comparable—
i.e. we can speak about distances, rather than paths in general—the order of distances is also 
the order of speeds. If the paths of two displacements—or the distances covered by them—
are equal, the order of times is opposite to the order of speeds. If neither the paths covered 
by two displacements, nor the corresponding times are equal, these displacements can not 
be ordered in the Aristotelian framework. Nevertheless, if their paths are comparable, such a 
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framework is at least compatible with the possibility of stating certain relations between two 
hypothetical distinct motions.  
In the chapter VII.5 of Physics, Aristotle states quite clearly four rules or theorems about 
motion and the possible relations of two hypothetical distinct motions25. He provides, of 
course, quite a discursive formulation of these rules, but their content can be formulated in a 
more formal language. In order to do it, I suppose that: 
— s(x, y, z) is the space covered by the mobile x upon which the force y  is applied during 
the time z; 
— t(x, y, z) is the time taken by the mobile x upon which the force y is applied to cover the 
space z. 
Then, the rules of Aristotle consist of the previous implications (where n is any positive 
integer; I put “n” where, to be faithful to Aristotle’s text, I should put “2”, since it is clear 
that Aristotle is here making an exempla of any integer multiple or sub-multiple):  
R.1 if s(nM,F,T) = S then s(M,F,T) = nS; 
R.2 if t(nM,F,S) = nT then t(M,F,S) = T;  
R.3 if t(M,F,nS) = nT then t(M,F,S) = T;  
R.4 if t(nM,nF,S) = T then t(M,F,S) = T 
Aristotle claims that it is so because “in this way, the proportion is preserved”26. This is 
not really a prove, however,  and, really, it would be difficult to understand how he could 
really prove his rules, without starting from any definition or postulate fixing the relations 
between mobiles, distances covered, forces applied upon a mobile, and time during which 
this is applied. Probably, he thought that these rules were evident enough to provide a 
description of the relations that would take place between two real distinct motions if they 
satisfied the conditions indicated in these rules. Thus, he does not define in general the 
notions he is employing in stating his rules, just because he thinks that these notions simply 
refer, in general, to empirical entities we can distinguish in reality when considering a 
particular motion. Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine something like some general laws that 
                                                
25 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, 249b, 30 – 250a, 7. 
26  Cf. ibid., 250a 4. 
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can be formulated in the framework of the classical theory of proportion, starting from 
which the rules of Aristotle, or other similar rules, can be proved. In Aristotle's rules, speed 
is not mentioned. It could occur in these general laws, however, and be used in the proof of 
Aristotle's rules as an intermediate term. The following are two groups of laws fixing 
respectively the relations between space, time and speed and between force, resistance and 
speed. I use the term “resistance” to refer, in the Aristotelian spirit, to something that 
opposes the motion: force brings about motion and resistance opposes the latter. If Si, Ti, Vi, 
Fi, and Ri (i = 1,2) are respectively the space (or distance) covered by two distinct motions, 
the times these motions take, their speeds, the forces that bring about them, and the 
resistances that oppose them, while K, L, H are three magnitudes taken in order to satisfy 
the antecedents of the implications, then these laws are: 
L.I.1 if S1 :S2 = K : L and T2 :T1 = L : H, then V1 :V2 = K : H 
L.I.2 if V1 :V2 = K : H and S1 :S2 = K : L, then T2 :T1 = L : H 
L.I.3 if V1 :V2 = K : H and T2 :T1 = L : H, then S1 :S2 = K : L  
L.II.1 if F1 :F2 = K : L and R2 :R1 = L : H, then V1 :V2 = K : H  
L.II.2 if V1 :V2 = K : H and F1 :F2 = K : L, then R2 :R1 = L : H  
L.II.3 if V1 :V2 = K : H and R2 :R1 = L : H, then F1 :F2 = K : L  
If we the mobile occurring in the Aristotle's laws is intended as a resistance, the proof of 
his rules starting from these laws is easy. I will just consider R.1. If one put R1 = nM, 
R2 = M, and F1 = F2 = F, then the two premises of L.II.1 become respectively F : F = 1 : 1 
and M : nM = 1 : n; thus, according to this law we have: V1 :V2 = 1 : n. If one pose then 
T1 = T2 = T, the two premises of L.I.3 become respectively V1 :V2 = 1 : n and T : T = n : n, 
thus, according to this law we have: S1 :S2 = 1 : n. From this it follows that if S1 = S, then 
S2 = nS, that is exactly what R.1 states. The proofs of the other rules are similar. 
I do not want to argue either that Aristotle actually asserted the laws L.I.1-3 and L.II.1-3, 
or that he referred to them implicitly. I simply argue that these rules formulate in a 
mathematical language, which was perfectly at disposal of Aristotle and the scholastics, 
some relations between some aspects or properties of actual motions that seem to be 
implicitly accepted by the latter. The laws of the first group compare two distinct motions, 
whatever they are, by stating some relations between the mutual ratios of the distance they 
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cover, the time they take and the speed the have. In these way they fix the relations between 
the distance covered by any motion, the time it takes and its speed. By using a typical 
language of theory of proportions, the first law of this group states that the speeds of two 
motions are between them in the composed ratio27 of the distances they cover and the times 
they take to do it. The other two laws state the converse of the same. The laws of the second 
group compare two distinct motions, whatever they are, by stating some relations between 
the mutual ratios of the forces that bring about them, the resistances that oppose to them, 
and their speeds. In these way they fix the relations between the force that brings about any 
motion, the resistance that opposes it and its speed. By using the language of theory of 
proportions again, the first law of this group states that the speeds of two motions are 
between them in the composed ratio of the forces that bring about them and the ratio of the 
resistances that oppose them28. In this case as well, the two other laws state the converse of 
the same.  
These are two different ways to compare motions, the first one according to their effects, 
the second one according to their causes. Thus, the previous laws and the deduction from 
them of the rules of Aristotle prove that the Aristotelian conception of motion, both of its 
effects and of its causes, is compatible with an application of mathematics to the science of 
motion, even if it is far away from any sort of mathematisation. 
These two distinct ways of comparing and characterising displacements, either according 
to their effects or according to their causes, are both part of the Aristotelian science of 
displacements. Though the second one is typical of the official Aristotelism, at least at 17th 
century—so much that we could define Aristotelian theory of displacements, as a “physical 
theory of displacements and their causes”29—the first one provides the basis for the main 
result (from a modern point of view) of this science, that is the distinction between uniform, 
uniformly difform and difformly difform displacements, introduced in the 14th century by 
                                                
27 Note that the term “ratio” does nor refer here to a specified object, as it does today; it is only a technical 
term occurring in the description of a certain system of proportions. 
28 Cf. Giusti (1990), p. XIII. 
29 Cf. ibid., p. XXIII. 
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Oresme and the Mertonians30. Such a distinction does not need any reference to the notions 
of speed and acceleration as variable ratios. Speed is nothing but a quality, whereas 
acceleration, or better difformity, is nothing but the phenomenon of variation of the 
intensity of speed. The previous distinction is thus a particular application of a more general 
distinction, concerning the modalities of variation of the intensity of a quality. A certain 
body moving according to a certain displacement is thus a particular subject with a certain 
quality, that is just speed. The intensity of such a quality can change in different ways. In 
particular, it can change with time and hence be taken as an instantaneous quality. This 
change can be either uniform or difform; in the first case the displacement is also uniform, 
while in the second case it is difform. This is a very natural distinction, but it can work only 
if we know, by an independent source, what the quality of speed is or, at least, how it can be 
measured. The basic idea both of the Mertonians and Oresme is that of measuring speeds by 
using the rectilinear spaces covered in a certain time by the moving bodies which are 
affected by these speeds, taken as constant with respect to this time. Thus31, the 
displacement of a certain body is uniform, if the spaces covered by this body in equal times 
are always equal, otherwise it is difform. Moreover, if it is difform, it is uniformly difform, 
if “in quacunque equali parte temporis, equalem acquirit latitudinem velocitatis”. 
The latter definition is, as such, quite obscure, since spaces are not mentioned. However, if 
we represent time by using a certain axis and different speeds at the extremes of equal times 
by means of equidistant perpendicular segments to such an axis, such a definition is 
perfectly sufficient for concluding that when the displacement is uniformly difform the 
extremities of these segments fall all on a straight line oblique with respect to the axis, 
while they fall on a straight line parallel to the axis, if the displacement is uniform. This is 
the basis of Heytesbury's and Oresme's32 diagrammatic representation of uniform and 
uniformly difform displacements and of the consequent proof of the “theorem of Merton 
college” which appeals to the comparison of these diagrams. This theorem states that the 
distances covered by a uniformly difform displacement at any given time is the same as that 
which is covered by a uniform rectilinear displacement, with a constant speed equal to the 
                                                
30 Cf. for a deep survey Clagett (1959). 
31 Cf. ibid, pp. 238 e 241-42 [doc. 4.4. ("William Heytesbury, Rules for Solving Sophisms"), 14-17 e 89-97]. 
32 Documents are in Glagett (1959) and (1968). 
14 Marco Panza 
speed of the uniformly difform motion in the middle of this time. Though it explicitly deals 
with speed as an instantaneous (or punctual) quality, the proof of this theorem is not 
founded on any explicit definition, either of speed in general, or of instantaneous (or 
punctual) speed. It simply works because of a diagrammatic formalism associated to the 
metaphysical idea of speed (or quality, in general). This formalism is far for providing a 
mathematical object modelling the real phenomenon of motion. It is only a convenient way 
to speak about it and represent certain of its properties. Once again it makes possible a 
convenient application of mathematics to the science of motion, but is far from being the 
result of a process of mathematisation. 
Different interpretations are possible of both Heytesbury's and Oresme's proof33. All of 
them agree on an essential point, however: these proofs have nothing to do with the 
classical paradigm of the theory of proportions. Under certain possible interpretations, they 
even break the most fundamental clause of this theory—that is, homogeneity—by 
considering a certain surface both as a representation of a linear distance and as the result of 
an infinite sum of segments representing instantaneous speeds. By contrast, for Galileo 
(who nevertheless proves twice the theorem of Merton College, by two distinct arguments, 
both analogous, even if not equivalent, to those of Heytesbury and Oresme34), as long as the 
science of motion is a mathematical science, it is founded on the theory of proportion. At 
most, this theory should be reformed, for the new aims of the science of motion35, but it can 
not be substituted with alternative formalisms. 
According to Galileo36, there is no unitary science of Aristotelian motion. Even though he 
still speaks of “local motion” (that is, displacement) to specify the object of his research, for 
him the science of motion is nothing but the mathematical science of displacements, since 
motions are nothing but displacements. Moreover, this science does not deal with the causes 
of motions—it is not a form of dynamics (or a theory of gravity and lightness)—but it deals, 
like in Oresme's and the Mertonians' approach, with motions as long as they are 
                                                
33 I have discussed Heytesbuury's proof in my (1994).  
34 Cf. Galilei (1632), 2th Giornata (Ed. Nat., pp. 254-256) and (1636), 3th Giornata (Ed. Nat., pp. 208-209).  
35 Cf. Giusti (1993). 
36 The locus classicus for Galileo's science of motion is obviously Galilei (1638), 3th and 4th Giornata. 
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characterised in terms of spaces that are covered and times that are spent for that—it is 
properly a kinematics (a theory of space and time)37. Nevertheless, even though this science 
has to be, according to Galileo, a mathematical science, it does not introduce its objects as 
mathematical ones. Rather it is founded on a mathematical characterisation of physical 
phenomena. Once again, Galileian science of motion results from an application of 
mathematics to the study of motion and not from a process of mathematisation. Galileo does 
not study, for example, uniformly accelerated motion, rather he studies the “natural motion” 
of a falling body. He recognises—by experimental and rational arguments—that this motion 
is such that speed uniformly changes in it, characterises it as a motion which satisfies a 
certain mathematical property in the context of the theory of proportions, and then looks for 
a deduction of its laws starting from such a mathematical characterisation. Both the first and 
the second stage of this research were far from being easy. As a young man, Galileo 
believed that the natural motion of a falling body was essentially uniform, afterwards he 
was quite sure that instantaneous speed was proportional to the covered space, rather than to 
the elapsed time38. 
Still, even when Galileo recognised that the natural motion of a falling body is “uniformly 
accelerated”, he did not characterise it as a motion whose acceleration is constant, since 
acceleration was not a quantity for him, but just a variation of speed (or a cause of such a 
variation). Moreover, he did not reduce speed to space and time, by means of an explicit 
mathematical definition. As long as it is a quantity, speed is as such, independent from 
space and time. As long as it is possible to provide correlative definitions of these three 
quantities, these definitions are just metaphysical characterisations and do not provide any 
sort of mathematical reduction. The problem of fixing the mathematical relations between 
these quantities is thus independent from the problem of definying or characterising them. 
This is a very natural situation in the context of the theory of proportion, where the 
condition of homogeneity prevents two non homogeneous quantities from operating with 
each other39. 
                                                
37 Cf. Giusti (1981), p. 7 and (1990), p. XXIII. 
38 Cf. Giusti (1990), pp. XIII-XLVII. 
39 Cf. Giusti (1981), p. 19 et (1990), pp. XXIX-XXX. 
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While Galileo bases his “new science” on the theory of proportion, Newton40 has 
completely absorbed the new Cartesian geometry. What was essentially new in Cartesian 
geometry41 was the definition of internal product and ratio between two continuous 
quantities: according to such a definition two continuous quantities could be multiplied and 
divided one for the other, the result being a third continuous quantity. This quantity is not 
understood by Descartes as produced by multiplication or division but it is only selected as 
the result of these operations in a domain of existing quantities, according to the previous 
choice of a unity. If the multiplied or divided quantities are homogenous and the chosen 
unity is also homogenous to them, the resulting quantity is necessarily homogenous to its 
factors. This is the case implicitly considered by Descartes in his definitions. Since these 
definitions use classical proportions, and a proportion does not require the homogeneity of 
the four quantities occurring in it, such a complete homogeneity is not necessary, however.  
Let be u the unity and a, b and c three continuos quantities such that a : c = u : b. If a and 
b are given and they are homogenous with each other, u must also be homogenous with a 
and b and the Cartesian product c of a and b is necessarily homogenous with its factors. 
However, if a and b are given and they are not homogenous with each other, such a 
proportion requires only the homogeneity of u with b and of c with a. Because of the 
commutativity of multiplication, this means that the Cartesian product of two non 
homogeneous quantities a and b can be homogenous either with a or with b.  
Let us imagine now that c and b are given and they are not homogeneous. The Cartesian 
ratio a of c and b is necessarily homogenous with c. But a can be also intended as the ratio 
of two other (homogenous) quantities C and B that are both not homogenous with it, and 
thus with c, and this ratio can be, at its turn, intended as equal to a new quantity A  non 
homogeneous both with c and b. The Cartesian ratio of the two non homogeneous quantities 
c and b can then be equal to a quantity A non homogeneous with both c and b. Thus—even 
without introducing measures of these quantities by means of segments or any other 
                                                
40 Newton mathematical theory of motion is exposed in the two first books to the Principia [cf. Newton 
(1687)]. 
41 Cf. Descartes (1637), pp. 297-298 and, for a commentary on this point, Bos and Reich (1990), pp. 199-
205 and Jullien (1996), pp. 75-76. 
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elements of a universal class of quantities42—it is possible to imagine, in the Cartesian 
framework, that speed is the ratio of space and time and that it is not homogeneous with 
both the former and the latter. The same is true of acceleration, that is now the ratio of speed 
and time, even though it is not, as such, homogeneous with both speed and time. 
This is a very nice situation from the point of view of definitions, but it is quite impossible 
to imagine how these definitions could be translated as such in the principles of a 
mathematical science of motion. The difficulty is obvious: Cartesian definitions of algebraic 
operations on continuous quantities are not, as such, constructive; they provide the 
conditions under which a certain quantity is the product or the ratio of two other given 
quantities, but they do not provide, as such, this product or ratio, even though the unities are 
fixed. Thus, they do not provide as such any way to compare, respectively, two different 
speeds or two different accelerations with each other.  
It is to solve such a difficulty (and not to provide suitable definitions) that Newton has to 
assume the reducibility of any mechanical quantity to its “measure” in terms of the elements 
of the universal class of segments. Segments are, in fact, the only continuous quantities for 
which Descartes provided not only a definition of internal multiplication and ratio but also 
showed how the results of these operations (as well as of power and of any sort of integral 
root) could de constructed. This means that if a certain motion is given, by giving the 
measures, in terms of segments, both of the space it covers and of the time taken to do it, 
then the measures of its speed and acceleration can be easily constructed under the form of 
suitable segments. It is just this construction that provides both a sense for algebraic (or 
even numerical) calculation of these quantities, and makes their algebraic expressions able 
to denote a proper object43. 
But a new difficulty arises. If the space covered by any motion is represented by a 
segment, Cartesian geometry cannot be used for representing trajectory of non rectilinear 
motions. Newton’s central idea to solve such a difficulty is directly connected to the 
Newtonian conceptions of inertia and force, since it appeals to the composition of motion.  
                                                
42 Cf. Giusti (1993), p. 169. 
43 For a precise characterization of the notion of proper object, cf. Panza (1997b). 
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The motion of any sort of body is represented by the curve described by a point reacting in 
a specific way to certain forces in the three-dimensional space where the motion takes place. 
If no force acts upon a moving body, it moves of a rectilinear uniform motion; other sorts of 
motions are due to the action of forces that accelerate the body and change its direction. The 
rectilinear direction of original uniform motion combines itself with the rectilinear 
directions associated with any force acting on it. If a force acts punctually upon the body, it 
changes its direction and speed, but as the force acts only in one point, after this point the 
body moves of a uniform rectilinear motion, as long as no other force occurs. Curvilinear 
trajectories are thus only possible if one or more forces act continuously upon the body and 
change continuously its direction. A single non rectilinear motion is then understood as a 
continuous composition of continuous changing virtual and rectilinear motions. Thus, at any 
point of the curvilinear trajectory of this motion, distinct virtual motions are associated, 
expressing the punctual speed of this motion and the forces acting in this point upon the 
moving body. Even though speed and forces are variable, these punctual virtual motions are 
not only rectilinear, but also uniform, since they express a punctual value of speed and 
forces. Hence, they are represented by suitable segments: the former by an oriented segment 
taken on the tangent to the curve (since the direction of this tangent is just the punctual 
direction of the curve), with its origins in it; the latter by any oriented segment with the 
same origin. Of course, two constant speeds or forces ϕ and ψ (or the punctual values ϕ and 
ψ of two speeds or forces) have to be respectively represented by two segments A and B 
verifying the proportion ϕ : ψ = A : B. In general, Newton interprets these segments as a 
representation of the rectilinear spaces that would be covered in a certain time by a body 
moving according to the rectilinear uniform motion expressing these speeds or forces (or 
their punctual values). Under this interpretation, they are measures of speeds and forces, 
since they represent spaces that measure motions, expressing speeds and forces. As long as 
speeds and forces are measured by these segments, they compose each other according to 
the law of the parallelogram applied to them. Finally, speeds and forces are related by the 
condition of proportionality between force and acceleration (where the constant of 
proportionality is intended as the mass of the moving body and it is consequently the same 
for any force acting upon the same body). 
Newton mechanics develops, according to these premises, as a geometry of trajectories—
referred to two or three Cartesian coordinates and described by points with a constant 
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mass—to each position of which suitable vectors representing punctual speeds and forces 
are associated. Time is in general understood as an external common parameter, fixing the 
measure of uniformity for the variation of any considered quantity. The aim is to determine 
trajectories, if forces and initial speeds and positions are given, or forces, if trajectories and 
initial speed and positions are given44. If only one body is considered, its mass can be taken 
as unitary. But it is also possible that the motions of two or more bodies are connected with 
each other, either because the moving bodies are linked, or because the forces acting upon 
each of these bodies depend on the masses and positions of the other bodies. If it is the case, 
we are faced with a an n-bodies problem. 
Since motions are considered as the effects of forces (or inertia), Newton mechanics is, as 
Aristotelian science of motion, a dynamic, rather than a kinematics. Nevertheless, as long as 
speeds and forces are no more understood by Newton as constant or variable qualities of 
motion, the latter is nothing else but a mathematical object. Thus, as long as it is studied by 
means of the mathematical theory introduced by Newton, motion is not given as a real 
external phenomenon. Rather, it is given as a mathematical object, once a certain system of 
connected geometrical entities is given. Hence, the Newtonian theory of motion is not only 
a mathematical science, i.e. the result of the application of mathematics to the study of 
motion, but it is also a science of mathematical objects, , i.e. the result of a process of 
mathematisation. Mathematics is not just a tool which is able to provide suitable 
characterizations of natural phenomena, as it was for Galileo; rather it is now a science 
inside which suitable models for natural phenomena are constructed and studied.  
As long as motion is, for Newton, a mathematical object, it is essentially a geometrical 
one. It is a relation between two magnitudes, represented by a certain curve, which has to be 
studied by a new sort of geometry. One of the aims of analytical mechanics in 18th century 
is that of transforming the Newtonian science of motion in an analytical science, i.e. to pass 
from a geometrisation of the science of motion to a new theory of motion where the latter is 
just an analytical object. I shall try to describe briefly this transition in the next paragraph. 
                                                
44 On the mathematical methods of Newton's mechanics, cf., among many other works, Herivel (1965) 
Whiteside (1966) et (1970), Cohen (1971), De Gandt (1986) and (1995), RVS (1987), Barthélémy (1992). In 
my (1991a), I have discussed an example of Newton treatment of motion of an isolated body, by comparing it 
to Lagrange's solution to the same problem. 
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3. Analytical Mechanics 
As long as speed is defined in general as a ratio between a certain space and a certain time, 
it could seem very natural to express punctual speed as the differential ratio ds/dt and 
consequently punctual acceleration by dv/dt = d
2
s / dt
2
. However, in order to understand 
these ratios as proper objects, that is quantities which could be exhibited, post-Cartesian 
mathematicians had to interpret them as the ratios of two segments, measuring respectively 
differentials or fluxions of space and time. Of course, they could assign a numerical value to 
them, but as long as continuity were not considered as a property of the field of real 
numbers (like in the modern conception based on Cantor-Dedekind's construction), this 
value can only be understood as a numerical expression of a continuous quantity, like a 
segment45. Thus, an analytical expression of mechanical quantities in terms of differentials 
or could not be understood in the end of 17th century as independent from a geometrical 
interpretation of them. Moreover, since the essential law of composition of motions (that 
provided also compositions of forces) was intrinsically geometrical46, as well the Newtonian 
representation of trajectories of motions as curves referred to two or three Cartesian 
coordinates, no analytical formulation of the new science of motion in terms of differential 
calculus could be independent from a geometrical basic treatment. Namely, such an 
analytical formulation could not be anything else than an analytical description of a 
geometrical model. Even though such a description would have simplified many Newtonian 
proofs, by using algebraic formalism where these proofs advanced by considering 
geometrical relations, it is a matter of fact that Newton never appeals to it. A number of 
reasons have been advanced to justify such an apparently strange attitude. However, I take it 
that one of them is that such a treatment would be probably appeared to Newton as an 
                                                
45 Before Cantor defined a real number as the limit of a Cauchy's succession of rational numbers, no 
justification was possible for the practice of using numbers in order to expresse continuous quantities. In such 
a situation, to ascribe to a segment (or any other continuous quantity) a numerical value was only a practical 
simplification without any justification. 
46 On the law of composition of motion and forces in the XVIIIth century, cf. Dhombres (1986), Dhombres 
et Radelet De Grave (1991) and Radelet De Grave (1987), (1988) et (1989). 
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unnecessary translation of an intrinsically geometrical science (where simplicity could have 
been gained at the expense of a loss of rigor, globality and intelligibility). 
As I have already said, the mathematical object of the Newtonian science of motion (that 
is just motion as a mathematical object) was intrinsically a geometrical object. With the 
term “intrinsically” I mean that this geometrical nature did not depend merely on an 
expository choice of Newton, but it depended on Newton’s conceptualisation of the objects 
of his science. 
Nevertheless, once Newton's Principia had been studied and understood, an analytical 
formulation of its principal definitions, results and proofs in terms of differential calculus, 
should have not been quite easy to obtain for a good mathematician of the end of 17th 
century. As I have already said, the first programmatic effort in this direction was made by 
Varignon. According to Blay’s reconstruction, this effort could be considered as the third 
stage of a progressive process along which—in the years following the publication of the 
Nova Methodus47—Leibnitian calculus appropriates the theory of motion.  
The first stage of this process48 is marked by a number of differential solutions for 
problems concerned with the determination of a certain curve responding to certain 
cinematic or dynamic properties, like the isochrone, the brachistochrone or the curve of 
equal pressure. What is typical of these solutions (proposed for the most part by Leibniz and 
Jacob and Johann Bernoulli) is that they proceed all from a preliminary reduction of the 
problem to a purely geometric condition, and apply then the differential calculus to such a 
condition. Thus, as Blay remarks, they “ne present finallement aucune conceptualisation 
différentielle spécifique de la science du mouvement”49. Moreover, the preliminary 
reduction does not depend on any geometrical representation (by means of the Newtonian 
vectors or anything else) of speed or forces, being founded on known relations between 
these latter entities and certain entities entering the usual geometrical representation of the 
searched trajectory. 
                                                
47 Cf. Leibniz (1684). 
48 Cf. Blay (1992), part. I, ch. 3, pp. 63-109, where the necessary bibliographical references are given. 
49 Cf. ibid., p. 109. 
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The second stage50 is completely due to Leibniz and consists in the establishment of a 
differential expression for the relations occurring in any motion between the instantaneous 
speed and both the elements of space and time and the elements of this speed itself. Leibniz 
reaches, for example, the determination of a “general principle”, where he generalises the 
law asserting that the speeds of two uniform motions are between them in the composed 
ratio of the ratio of distances and the inverse ratio of times, by stating a relation of 
proportionality between ds and vdt51. As Blay remarks, this not yet a differential 
characterisation of the instantaneous speed. Rather, instantaneous speed is geometrically 
represented by certain (infinitesimal) segments, that are thought as rectilinear spaces 
covered in a given time, in such a way that it is impossible to calculate the times when 
spaces and speeds are given52. 
Finally, the third stage53 consists in Varignon’s differential characterisation of the 
principal notions of Newton’s theory and of their general relations. This is done by means 
of a geometrical representation not only of certain linear spaces or trajectories, but also of 
times speeds and accelerative forces. This representation enables Varignon to eliminate any 
constraint of homogeneity, since it allows him to compare spaces, times, speeds and 
accelerative forces by means of a comparison of segments and leads him to the crucial 
identities v = 
ds
dt
, dv = 
d
2
s
dt
 and γ = 
dv
dt
 (γ being the accelerative force). These identities 
make the solution of a number of cinematic and dynamic problems independent of a 
geometric analysis: if the data are expressed by means of suitable equations, the solutions 
can also be expressed by other equations derived by using the algorithm of the calculus. As 
Blay says: 
[Varignon] elabore la solution de[...][ces] problèmes, non plus comme ses prédécesseurs, à partir des 
éléments géométriques représentés dans telle ou telle figure, mais directement à partir des relations 
entre les symboles. Dans cette perspective […], la figure, essentielle pour le développement et 
l’organisation de la pensée géométrico-infinitésimale, devient progressivement avec Varignon simple 
                                                
50 Cf. ibid, part. II, ch. 1, pp. 113-152, where the necessary bibliographical references are given. 
51 Cf. ibid., p. 129. 
52 Cf. ibid., pp. 150 and 152. 
53 Cf. ibid, part II, ch. 2, pp. 153-221, where the necessary bibliographical references are given. 
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diagramme. C’est-à-dire que cette figue perd sa valeur traditionnelle d’intellection pour prendre une 
valeur toute secondaire d’illustration54. 
Varignon's approach was largely improved by the treatment of mechanical problems in the 
Leibnitian school, in particular by Jean Bernoulli55, and is the basis both of Euler's 
Mechanica56 and of the footnotes of Le Seur and Jacquier to Geneva's edition of the 
Principia57, where a number of Newton's proofs and arguments are reformulated in 
analytical terms, according to the algorithm of the calculus. 
As I have already said, there is certainly a sense according to which these important 
results constitute the first stage of analytical mechanics, they mark the birth of it, as Blay 
says. However, there is also a sense according to which the birth of analytical mechanics is 
not there, it does not only depend only on the translation of Newton's definitions, principles 
and proofs in the analytical language of differential (or fluxional) calculus.  
A first remark is obvious: all the differentials entering Varignon’s formulation of 
mechanical relations are infinitesimal differences between segments or portions of curves; 
moreover, they measure (or express) mechanical entities, just because they are infinitesimal 
differences. As long we deal with a cinematic or a simple dynamic problem, this is nothing 
but a question of interpretation of algorithmic procedures, but when a more difficult 
problem is considered the geometrical nature of Varignon’s approach becomes manifest 
from an operative point of view too.  
Let us consider the example of the expression of the punctual central force that is 
responsible for a curvilinear motion58. The following is a simplified version of Varignon’s 
argument drawn from Blay’s reconstruction59. Let QL be the trajectory described by a 
moving body because of a central force with centre in C. Let AH = x and HL = y be the 
coordinates (respectively linear and circular, with centre in C) of the running point L. 
                                                
54 Cf. ibid., p. 161. 
55 Consider, for example, the famous controversy on the inverse problem of central forces on which cf. 
Bertoloni-Meli (1993), pp. 208-215, where a bibliography is given. 
56 Cf. the pervious footnote (10). 
57 Cf. Newton (G). 
58 It is the object of Varignon (1700) on which cf. Blay (1992), pp. 193-213. 
59 Cf. Varignon (1700), p. 85 and Blay (1992), pp. 197-198. 
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Varignon considers a point l infinitesimally close to L and assumes that the accelerative 
force γ acting on L during the time dt  is proportional to the infinitesimal segment LR. Then, 
he decomposes this forces into two orthogonal components taken respectively on the 
direction of the tangent LM and the normal LN to QL in L. Since γ and its orthogonal 
components can be taken as constant during dt, we can assume the identity 
!
t
!
=
LP
LR
, where 
γt is the tangential component of γ. Now, because L and l are two points infinitely close to 
each other, the infinitesimal curvilinear triangle LRl, can be considered as a rectilinear one, 
which is similar to the infinitesimal triangle LRP. Hence, we will have also 
LP
LR
=
LR
Ll
 and 
thus: 
!
t
!
=
dx
ds
 or γt  = !
dx
ds
. Consider now the (virtual) rectilinear motion along LM, due to 
the force γt. Since this motion is rectilinear, it satisfies the identities d
2
s = dvdt  and 
dv = γtdt, which entail: d
2
s = !
dx
ds
dt
2
 or ! =
dsd
2
s
dxdt
2
= v
dv
dx
. 
Even though it uses the differential algorithm, this argument consists of a Newtonian 
analysis of the central force acting upon the body. This is a very simple exemplification of 
my point: Varignon’s differential expression of mechanical quantities and relations does not 
enable him (when the problem is a dynamic one and non rectilinear motions are concerned) 
to avoid any appeal to the Newtonian method of analysis of forces, which is founded on the 
consideration of intrinsically geometrical models. Now, according to the meaning of this 
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term I am considering here, what is essential in order to speaking about “analytical 
mechanics” is neither the expression of speed and acceleration by means of differential or 
fluxional ratios, nor the expression of the link between the different variables occurring in a 
geometrical model of motion by means of suitable equations where analytical forms occur. 
Rather, it is just the substitution of Newtonian geometrical models with equations of motion 
as a basic description of a certain mechanical situation. When simple situations are 
considered, the difference between these two approaches is not always evident and often 
vanishes. In a sense, Newton himself uses his principles to determine equations of motions 
(even though these equations are always understood as a description of a geometrical 
model), and the basic idea of determining standard forms for equations expressing the data 
of a mechanical problem of a certain sort and containing its solution is already explicit in 
Varignon's memoirs—particularly when resisting motion is considered60—Bernoulli's 
solution of the problem of shock of bodies61 and, overall, Euler's Mechanica. Nevertheless, 
in all these texts, equations of motions are the result of an analysis of forces—a real 
Pappusian analysis, applied to geometrical models of mechanical problems—and their 
general form results from codified methods for such an analysis, which are applied to 
different sorts of problems. 
In the original sense of such a term—that Viète and Descartes had inherited by Pappus—
this is a very analytical procedure, since it starts with the assumption of what is searched as 
it were given62. But it is not so, if the term is taken in the new sense it will take in 18th 
century. In 18th century, mathematical analysis is neither the first stage of the Pappusian 
“method of analysis and synthesis”, nor a particular procedure for solving mathematical 
problems—as it is in classical language. Moreover, it is not a branch of mathematics—as it 
is today . It is a mathematical theory—the new theory of functions—but it is not a particular 
theory among many other, since its aim is a reformulation of mathematics as a whole: a 
function is not a particular mathematical object, among a number of other mathematical 
objects, rather it is an abstract representation of a quantity, and mathematics is just the 
                                                
60 Cf. in particular Varignon (1707) and for a commentary Blay (1992), pp. 280-299 and Panza (1991a), pp. 
523-524. 
61 Cf. Bernoulli (1727). 
62 Cf. on this point Otte and Panza (1997) and in particular Panza (1997a). 
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science of quantities63. Considered as functions, quantities need not to be distinguished 
between numbers (or discrete quantities) and magnitudes (or continuous quantities), and 
magnitudes need not to be qualified, according to their specific nature. As long as it is 
represented by a certain function, a quantity need not to be exhibited as such, and it is not 
necessary to give specific criteria of identity for it. General criteria for functions work in 
any circumstance and if we are studying a particular sort of quantities, we must only 
provide a suitable interpretation of a consistent formalism. Thus, 18th century mathematical 
analysis is a unitary formulation of mathematics. In fact; it is the first unitary exposition of 
the science of quantities. More generally, in 18th century science and philosophy, the ideal 
of analysis is that of a logic organisation of knowledge, according to an internal and unitary 
order coming from general principles or elements64, and transmitting to particular 
applications of them. The place of mechanics, in such an organisation, is not simply that of 
a collection of standard methods for solving problems concerning with motion, or, as 
Truesdell says, with “the enforced changes of positions and shape which [...] things 
suffer”65. Rather, it is the place of the science of these changes, understood as general and 
universal phenomena expressed by mathematical objects and governed by general laws of 
nature. 
In such a framework, the program of analytic mechanics could not have been merely a 
program of exposition of Newtonian mechanics by means of a certain language. It was a 
program of edification of a more general science, founded on general principles expressing 
the natural laws of motions (rather than on Pappusian analysis of geometrical models), 
where Newton's results are particular cases of general results. Of course, the general theory 
of functions could not provide, as such, the principles of this science. However, these 
principles were expressed by general equations where suitable functions occur, in such a 
way that mathematical deduction could operate starting from them according to the methods 
and results of the general science of functions (that is analysis) in order to provide the 
particular equations characterising a particular mechanical situation.  
                                                
63 I have discussed this topic at length in Panza (1992), Ch. II.2. 
64 Cf. d'Alembert (El. Sci.). 
65 Cf. the previous footnote (5). 
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Let us consider the example of the problem of motion of one or more bodies again. The 
essential aim of what I would like to call “analytical mechanics”, as long as it was 
concerned with this problem, was to determine a little number of general principles—like 
those of the least action, the conservation of the vis viva or the virtual velocities—according 
to which it were possible to express the dynamic characters of a system of n bodies, upon 
which any sort of forces act, by means of suitable equations66. As long as these equations 
were general, they referred to any sort of mechanical system, independently from the 
number of bodies and forces acting on them. Stricto sensu, they were forms or schemes of 
equations. But, as long as forms or schemes of equations are equations, they worked, at the 
same time, as the starting point of deductive proofs of general results relative to any sort of 
mechanical system, and as the guidelines for writing the equations of motion of particular 
systems. From such a point of view, motion is no longer merely a mathematical object, 
rather, it is an analytic object, i.e. a functional relation expressed by an analytical form. 
This approach was not only different from the Newtonian one for epistemological reasons. 
It made also possible address problems that no analysis of force could solve, as those 
concerning a great number of bodies. Moreover, from such a point of view, the different 
systems of bodies became elements of an infinite domain of objects of a common and 
universal form that could be easily expressed in general. As Kant said, it made possible to 
treat motion as a “universal in concreto”67.  
Understood in this way, i.e. as a system of deductive consequences of general principles 
expressed by suitable equations (or forms of equations), 18th century analytical mechanics 
seems to be completely independent of Newtonian geometrical models and analysis of 
forces.  
However, this is not the case, if the question of justification of the general principles is 
considered. In fact, even though these principles were often formulated in metaphysical 
terms and supported by metaphysical arguments, they could only be translated in a certain 
equation when they were applied to something such as a simple, and easily generalisable, 
mechanical model, which is, necessarily, in 18th century, a Newtonian geometrical model. 
This is even clearer if mathematical arguments are considered. These arguments were either 
                                                
66  Cf. on this point Panza (1991b), (1996a) and (1999)  
67 Cf. Kant (A), pp. 734-735, and (B), pp. 762-763. 
28 Marco Panza 
a priori or a posteriori68. The former tried to deduce the equations expressing the general 
principles directly from something as a Newtonian analysis of forces applied to a general 
system; the latter merely consisted in the verification of the equivalence between the 
consequences of the general principles when they were applied to simple systems and the 
consequences of Newtonian analysis of force applied to the same systems. In the same way, 
and for obvious reasons, 18th century mechanics could not be independent of Newtonian 
geometrical models, if the aim was to give a proper mechanical content both to the 
analytical description of a mechanical situation and to the different sorts of mechanical 
equations.  
Thus, an unsolved tension, between the philosophical need of elimination of Newtonian 
geometric analysis of forces and the mathematical need of appealing to them is intrinsic in 
the birth and evolution of analytical mechanics in 18th century: in my sense, no history of 
this birth and evolution is possible if it is not also a history of such a tension, which is also a 
tension between two distinct way of accomplishing a mathematisation of the science of 
motion. 
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